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Are Small and Medium States Superior to Large? 
 
THE ROLE A STATE’S SIZE PLAYS IN REGIONAL INTEGRATION 
 
JEROME MARSTON 
Boston College 
M.A. Candidate, Political Science 
 
 
 
This study examines the relationship between a state’s size and regional integration.  
Specifically, this study empirically focuses on whether a particular size of state plays a 
disproportionate role in establishing regional institutions. This paper undertakes research in an 
attempt to settle a dispute that has arisen within the literature. Expressly, whether it is small, 
medium, or large states that encourage regional integration and furthermore whether the former 
two in fact resist the latter’s attempts to do so. In an effort to resolve this debate, the paper 
explores critical time periods in the establishment of the European Union and MERCOSUR.  
This paper draws two conclusions from the empirical data presented. First, of the independent 
variables analyzed, medium states are more likely to play a disproportionate role in the initial 
establishment of regional institutions. Second, small states are more likely to play a 
disproportionate role in the subsequent advancement of these same institutions.1 
 
 
 
Regional integration merits further study as the anomalous process is often a precursor 
to peace, prosperity, and citizen liberties. This paper analyzes bounded time periods during the 
establishment of regional institutions, as well as several failed attempts at the same, in an effort 
to expose the factors that contribute to the formation of such institutions.  Perhaps disentangling 
these factors will foster integration in other regions.  The European Union (EU) and 
MERCOSUR are two examples of successful regional integration, although they are at different 
stages of institutionalization.  This study explores which size of state most contributed to the 
establishment of the regional institutions found in Western Europe and the Southern Cone.  
 
Literature Review 
According to Russett and Oneal (2001, 160), the number of intergovernmental 
organizations in the world had risen to 293 by 1990. The widespread emergence of regional                                                         
1 The author would like to thank Professor David A. Deese in the Department of Political Science at Boston College 
for his helpful feedback.  All mistakes are the author’s. Contact the author at MARSTOJE@bc.edu.  
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institutions throughout the world has prompted many scholars to consider the possible impetuses 
to the phenomenon (Mansfield and Milner 1999). Several scholars have focused on the role of 
the United States as the global hegemon in regional integration (see Fawn 2009, 25-27), while 
others place an emphasis on the increased bargaining power small and medium states gain in 
relation to the global hegemon by organizing regionally (see, for example, Mera 2005, 116, 139).   
A specific debate has arisen in the literature over the size of a state and the role it 
therefore plays in establishing formal regional institutions.  Katzenstein (1997, 3, 259-260) posits 
that small states promote the formation of regional institutions, as they foster stability and 
constrain larger members from exercising power.  Distinct from Katzenstein, Fawcett (2004, 
429, 439) suggests that small states establish regional institutions as these institutions allow the 
small states to multiply their influence and lock in larger states.   Spero (2004, 23), on the other 
hand, asserts that middle powers establish regional institutions as a method of aligning with all of 
their neighbors in an effort to lessen traditional security dilemmas.  Contrary to the previous 
three views, Grieco maintains that weaker states oppose larger states establishing formal regional 
institutions, as they fear doing so would reflect the interests of the more powerful states and 
further increase regional imbalances (1997, 176; Mansfield and Milner 1999, 617).  Finally, 
Mansfield and Milner (1999, 611) propose that large states establish regional institutions as a 
means to consolidate their influence over their weaker neighbors.   
The paper attempts to resolve this debate by contrasting the five competing views against 
a central question: which size of state most contributed to the establishment of the regional 
institutions found in Western Europe and South America’s Southern Cone? 
 
Research Design 
To answer the central research question, this paper draws on five hypotheses: 
 
(H1) This paper first tests the hypothesis that small states play a disproportionate role in  
establishing formal regional institutions.  As suggested by Katzenstein (1997, 3, 259- 
260), smaller states do so as regional institutions foster stability and constrain larger  
members from exercising power.  
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(H2) This paper formulates a subsequent hypothesis to test the central research question.  
 The second hypothesis is that small states play a disproportionate role in the 
 establishment of regional institutions as these institutions allow them to multiply their 
 influence and lock in larger states (Fawcett 2004, 429, 439).   
 
(H3) In contrast to the first two, the research paper proposes a further hypothesis.  In the 
 third hypothesis, middle powers establish regional institutions as a method of aligning 
 with all of their neighbors in an effort to lessen traditional security dilemmas (Spero 
 2004, 23).   
 
(H4) Subsequently, this study considers the hypothesis that small and medium states 
 actually resist the establishment of regional institutions instead of fostering their 
 formation, as the first three hypotheses maintained.  As Grieco (1997, 176) proposes, 
 within a region in which the distribution of capabilities has shifted or states expect a shift 
 to occur, those states disadvantaged by the redistribution oppose the establishment of a 
 formal regional institution.  This is the case, as weaker states fear that an institution 
 would merely reflect the interests of the more powerful members.   
 
(H5) The final hypothesis tested within this paper is that large states establish regional 
 institutions as a means to consolidate their political influence over weaker counterparts 
 (Mansfield and Milner 1999, 611). 
 
The chart below illustrates the five hypotheses.  Each row represents one hypothesis.  The 
column on the left lists the size of state that corresponds to each hypothesis.  The right-hand 
column contains brief summaries of each hypothesis. 
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         Motivation for 
           Size of State:    Regional Integration: 
  
(H2) Small States 
(H1) Small States 
Allow small states to multiply their in8luence and lock in larger states 
Foster stability and constrain larger members  
(H3) Middle Powers  Method of aligning with all of their neighbors in an effort to lessen security dilemmas 
(H4) Small and Medium   RESIST regional integration, fearing that an institution would re8lect the interests of the more powerful 
(H5) Large States  A means to consolidate their political in8luence over weaker counterparts   
 
 
 
The dependent variable in this study is the establishment of a formal regional institution, 
specifically, the establishment of the European Union in Western Europe and MERCOSUR in 
the Southern Cone.  For the purposes of this study, this paper defines the establishment of a 
formal regional institution as the year and a half leading up to the formation of the European 
Coal and Steel Community (founded in April 1951) and the European Economic Community 
(launched in March 1957).  In the case of the Southern Cone, establishment is defined as the year 
and a half leading up to the formation of MERCOSUR (initiated in March 1991) and the 
formalization of the customs union by the Treaty of Ouro Preto (signed in December 1994). This 
paper measures establishment in this manner for several reasons.  First, these institutions came 
into existence as opposed to other attempts. This paper considers the study of successful 
institutions, as doing so lends external validity.  Second, regional institutions are not formed over 
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night, so the lead up to their establishment must be considered.  Third, the interests of this study 
lie in the role states play at the time institutions are established instead of the durability of these 
institutions.  Thus, the precursor to or the formation of the institution itself is considered, as 
opposed to a later manifestation of the institution.   
In an effort to preclude potential confounding variables this paper also analyzes failed 
attempts at regional integration.  Doing so will more accurately answer the primary research 
question of the paper.  As such, this article considers cases within Western Europe and the 
Southern Cone in which integration was unsuccessful around or within the same year-and-a-half 
time frames discussed above.   
For the purposes of this study the term large state refers to regional hegemons.  Grieco 
suggests that weaker states may oppose the formation of an institution if they expect a shift in 
capabilities to occur; therefore this study also considers potential regional hegemons (1997, 176).  
The terms “potential” and “perceived” hegemon are used interchangeably throughout the paper 
and refer to Brazil and Germany.  Small states, on the other hand, include Paraguay, Uruguay, 
Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands.  The term medium state refers to Argentina and 
France.  Italy is rarely addressed within this research paper, although presumably it would be 
considered a medium state.  This paper makes an effort to avoid any further consideration of the 
semantics surrounding state size.  For a more in-depth discussion of Brazil’s status as a large 
state within the region refer to Fernandez (1992) pages 67-69.  Also, Mansfield and Milner 
(1999, 612) refer to Germany as a regional hegemon in their article and for further discussion of 
the subject refer to Pedersen (1998, 3-5, 34-35). 
This study explores three independent variables: (1) the role small states play in 
establishing regional institutions, (2) the role medium states play in establishing regional 
institutions, and (3) the role large states play in establishing regional institutions.  This article 
measures the role a state plays in establishing a regional institution through case study.   The 
following sections analyze primary sources such as newspaper articles, government documents, 
and elite speeches and memoirs from the time periods discussed above, as well as the 
surrounding historical context.  The goal of these case studies is to establish whether a certain 
size of state played a disproportionate role at the critical points in the integration process. 
The term “disproportionate role” is defined as a state playing a more robust and 
determined role than its neighbors to ensure that the process of regional integration is initiated, 
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maintained, or completed.  A state that initiates regional integration undoubtedly plays a more 
robust and determined role in the process than its neighbors.  If this state had not done so, or 
another state had done so earlier, then presumably the present institution would be slightly 
different.  This research paper considers the initiation of regional integration as sufficient 
evidence that a state played a disproportionate role in that stage of integration.  In addition, a 
state is considered to play a disproportionate role if it appears to have been crucial to negotiating 
the establishment of the organization.  A state is also regarded as having played a 
disproportionate role if it was integral in ensuring that integration succeeded, including during a 
latter stage of integration.   
 
Western Europe 
European Coal and Steel Community (April 1951) 
The first case of regional integration this research paper considers is the European Coal 
and Steel Community (ECSC).  Most observers consider the ECSC to be the starting point of the 
EU.  The Community brought France, Germany, Italy, as well as the smaller countries Belgium, 
the Netherlands, and Luxembourg (Benelux) together.  The aim of the ECSC was to organize the 
free movement as well as to provide free access to the sources of their production and an 
authority to supervise the market.  The Schuman Declaration, proposed by French Foreign 
Minister Robert Schuman, initiated the ECSC in 1950 (Europa 2005). 
In May 1950 Jean Monnet, the Commissioner for the first French National Plan, 
presented a memorandum to Robert Schuman and Georges Bidault, the French Foreign Minister 
and French Prime Minister respectively, discussing a proposed means of embedding France and 
Germany in a common interest.  The memorandum was the precursor to the meeting in which 
Monnet and his team came together to draft the declaration, which Schuman would make on 
May 9, 1950 (Salmon and Nicoll 1997, 40).  Monnet writes, “the German situation is rapidly 
becoming a dangerous cancer for peace in the near future, and for France at once, if the Germans 
do not point themselves towards hope and collaboration with free peoples” (Salmon and Nicoll 
1997, 42).  He then continues, “we must abandon the forms of the past and embark on the road of 
transformation both by the creation of economic conditions on a common base and by the 
establishment of new authorities accepted by national sovereignties” (Salmon and Nicoll 1997, 
43). 
  
Josef Korbel Journal of Advanced International Studies | 7 
The Schuman Declaration of May 1950 “proposes that Franco-German production of 
coal and steel as a whole be placed under a common High Authority, within the framework of an 
organization open to the participation of the other countries of Europe.”  He subsequently states, 
“the solidarity in production thus established will make it plain that any war between France and 
Germany becomes not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible” (Salmon and Nicoll 1997, 
44).  
There is a general consensus among scholars of political science and history that France 
initiated the European Coal and Steel Community.  A. W. Deporte writes, “the deadlock of the 
attempt to move toward greater European unity…was broken only—but definitively—by the 
bold and imaginative proposal made by French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman” (1979, 221).  
DePorte (1979, 222) goes on to say that the ECSC was a “defensive policy” on the part of the 
French.  Furthermore, he states that “the Benelux countries did not want to be left out of a union 
including their two most important neighbors” (1979, 223). Thomas Pedersen confirms “the 
Schuman Declaration of 9 May 1950 is normally seen as the founding document of the European 
communities.  It is customary to describe the ECSC initiative as a French initiative” (1998, 76).  
John McCormick (1999, 46-48) also attributes a majority of the formation of the ECSC to the 
efforts of Monnet and France.   
 
Failed Attempts 
The first failed attempt at European integration this paper considers is an effort 
undertaken by Germany.  In an interview with a U.S. journalist on March 7, 1950, Konrad 
Adenauer, the Chancellor of Germany, discusses his proposal for a union between France and 
Germany.  The Chancellor suggests that such a union would forestall nationalism in Germany 
and mitigate territorial disputes, between the two countries, over the Saar region (Pedersen 1998, 
76).  According to Salmon and Nicoll (1997, 40), however, the German proposal was “ill-
received” in France. On the other hand, it is interesting to note that several months later the 
French initiative to integrate was well received in Germany.  According to Pedersen (1998, 76), 
“when Schuman launched the Schuman plan in May 1950, Adenauer immediately threw his 
weight behind it.”  
This paper now turns to a second failed attempt at integration, the Organization for 
European Economic Cooperation (OEEC).  Set up in April 1958, the Organization was 
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established to make joint decisions regarding the distribution and use of Marshall Aid.  As the 
sole contributor of funds to the organization, the United States laid plans for the supranational 
economic management of Europe by insisting that states make decisions jointly.  The OEEC 
stayed in operation for twelve years; however, it did not lead to integration.  England did not 
want to fully enter into an arrangement with the Continental states and France and the other 
countries had developed plans for recovery that were restrictive of the free market (George and 
Bache 2001, 50-51).  In sum, “despite its economic leverage, the United States simply did not 
have sufficient political weight to overcome the combined opposition of Britain, France, and the 
smaller European states to allowing OEEC to develop as a powerful supranational organization” 
(George and Bache 2001, 51). 
 
Parting Remarks 
 The case of the ECSC as well as the two failed attempts at European integration reveal 
three conclusions.  First, these cases demonstrate that France, a middle power, played a larger 
role in founding the ECSC than the small Benelux states.  Critics of this conclusion might 
suggest that the ECSC evolved from the customs union formed by the Benelux countries in 1948 
(McCormick 1999, 32), which would aggrandize the role the smaller states played in integration.  
However, the ECSC did not arise from an existing customs union between the Benelux 
countries; in fact, the Community regulated coal and steel between France and Germany.  The 
Benelux countries and Italy were subsequently invited to join, as the Community was left open to 
other like-minded European countries.   Furthermore, the case of the ECSC and the two failed 
attempts demonstrate that Germany, the regional hegemon, was unable to initiate European 
integration, as the attempt was not well received in France.  Finally, the last failed attempt 
reveals that the United States, a global superpower, was unable to ensure full regional 
integration, despite its economic and political clout.   
 
European Economic Community (March 1957) 
 The literature widely considers the European Economic Community (EEC) to be the next 
decisive step in the formation of the EU.  The EEC aimed to further European integration 
through the expansion of trade on the continent (Europa 2005).  The Treaty of Rome, which 
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established the Community, states that member-governments are “resolved by thus pooling their 
resources to preserve and strengthen peace” (Vaughan 1976, 74). 
 The EEC Council works to “ensure coordination of the general economic policies of 
Member States” as well as to “have power to take decisions” per article 145 of the Treaty of 
Rome (Vaughan 1976, 88).  Article 146 of the Treaty states that the Council will have one 
member per member-government.  Furthermore, Article 148 states, “save as otherwise provided 
in this Treaty, the Council shall act by a majority of its members…Where the Council is required 
to act by a qualified majority, the votes of its members shall be weighted as follows: Belgium 2, 
Germany 4, France 4, Italy 4, Luxembourg 1, Netherlands 2” (Vaughan 1976, 89).  
Prior to the establishment of the EEC, the Spaak committee, headed by the Belgian 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Paul-Henri Spaak, met between July 1955 and March 1956 to 
discuss the Benelux memorandum.  The memorandum combined Monnet’s ideas for further 
sectoral integration with Dutch Foreign Minister Johan Willem Beyen’s idea for a general 
common market.  After numerous compromises, the six member governments agreed to the 
Report and the committee was subsequently transformed into a conference.  The conference was 
responsible for drafting the Treaties of Rome, which established the EEC (George and Bache 
2001, 72-73).  The Treaties and the committee “owed a great deal to his [Spaak’s] energetic and 
skilful chairing” (George and Bache 2001, 73). 
At the time of the EEC’s establishment, the Dutch government’s report to the second 
chamber of the Estates General reads, “it has always been the intention that the  
establishment of the ECSC would lead to a more extensive economic integration, and the 
moment at which this development is to become reality provides the Netherlands’ 
government, which has always desired and promoted it, an occasion for deep 
satisfaction…The ever more intimate interweaving and fusion of their economic interests 
and the continuous consideration of vital facets of their [the member states’] economic, 
social, and monetary affairs necessary in connection with the Common Market, cannot 
but strengthen more and more the political ties between the Member States.  Inevitably 
this will with the passage of years strengthen and seal the solidarity and unity of Europe.  
For various reasons this unity is of essential political importance.  These reasons…may 
here once again be briefly summarized.  In the first place it is a matter of West European 
survival that rivalry between France and Germany be terminated…In the third place this 
unity will express even more strongly Germany’s ties with the West” (Schmitt 1969, 147-
148). 
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In regard to the report, Schmitt (1969, 146) states, “the Netherlands authorities expressed 
disappointment that the Treaty [of Rome] did not go further on the road of union than it did…”   
There is a general consensus among scholars of political science and history that the 
Benelux countries viewed the EEC as an opportunity to both constrain German influence and to 
multiply their own influence counter to German interests.  Richard Vaughan (1976, 94) writes, 
“it remains true that Benelux [the Benelux Economic Union] acted historically as a model, or 
inspiration, for the European Communities.  The Three paved the way for the Six.”  Peter J. 
Katzenstein (1997, 251) adds, “widespread suspicion of a potential revival of German militarism 
made it imperative to embed a rearmed Germany fully in a Western and European framework.  
After the defeat of the European Defense Community in the French Assembly, the European 
Economic Community became a plausible option for anchoring Germany in a European 
economic network.”  He goes on to say that “the effects of German power are softened because 
of Germany’s participation in European institutions” (1997, 260).  Furthermore, in writing about 
the EEC, A. W. DePorte (1979, 224) states, “it was as if the very strengthening of the FRG 
[Federal Republic of Germany] lent urgency to a new attempt to channel and circumscribe its 
freedom of action by erecting new European structures.”  Moreover, DePorte (1979, 223) and 
John McCormick (1999, 31) point out that the German Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, saw 
integration as an opportunity to rebuild West German respectability.  According to Stephan 
George and Ian Bache, aside from respectability, Germany was also willing to be constrained by 
its neighbors as the EEC offered “the considerable prize of the common market in industrial 
goods” (2001, 75). 
 
Parting Remarks 
 The year-and-a-half time frame leading up to the EEC provides ample evidence of the 
strong role played by the small states in engendering regional integration.  First, the Dutch 
government’s report demonstrates that members of this small state’s government took a potential 
German threat seriously.  It also reveals that the Netherlands viewed the EEC as an opportunity 
to constrain a rearmed Germany.  The report also makes it apparent that the Netherlands had 
actually hoped for further integration than the EEC achieved. 
 The critical role played by Paul-Henri Spaak further demonstrates the necessity of the 
Benelux countries to the regional integration of Europe.  As does the Benelux initiative, which 
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laid the groundwork for the Treaty of Rome.  As its name implies, the initiative was developed 
and subsequently circulated by Foreign Ministers from the Benelux countries (George and Bache 
2001, 73).    
Finally, the voting structure of the EEC Council makes evident the incentive for the 
smaller states to encourage regional integration.  Integration allowed the three small states to 
multiply their influence vis-à-vis the large state.  Specifically, the Benelux countries could wield 
more votes than Germany (five to four) when the Council was required to act by a qualified 
majority.  It must be noted, however, that this is not the case within the Assembly where the 
Benelux countries, when combined, wield two votes less than Germany, as specified by Article 
138 of the Treaty (Vaughan 1976, 87).   
 
The Southern Cone 
MERCOSUR (March 1991) 
 This research paper now turns to integration in the Southern Cone.  The Treaty of 
Asunción established the common market MERCOSUR, in March 1991, between Argentina, 
Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay.  The Act of Buenos Aires, signed the year prior between 
Argentina and Brazil, led to the Treaty of Asunción (Guerrero 2005, 22; Phillips 2004, 88).   
Before these steps were taken, Argentina and Brazil had long suffered a degree of 
mistrust and rivalry stemming from their mutual ambitions to become regional powers 
(Guerroero 2005, 22; Cason 2000, 25; Manzetti 1990, 114).  According to Kaltenthaler and Mora 
(2002, 82), these ambitions date back to their independence and culminated during the 1970s 
when the military regimes leading the countries engaged in an arms race, including the import 
and production of a nuclear power capability. 
 In the lead up to the Act of Buenos Aires, Raúl Alfonsín and José Sarney, the presidents 
of Argentina and Brazil respectively, began economic integration as a political initiative to foster 
cooperation.  Prior to the signing of the Act, under the Argentine Brazilian Economic Integration 
Program (ABEIP) the two presidents held meetings every six months to sign protocols lowering 
tariffs in specific industries (Cason 2000, 25).  Although outside of the year-and-a-half parameter 
set up by this research paper, it is important to recognize that “the initiative for the ABEIP came 
from Alfonsín,” the president of Argentina (Cason 2000, 25).  “Both new governments reasoned 
that if they tied themselves more closely to each other’s economy, a renewal of traditional 
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conflicts and rivalries would be less likely” (Cason 2000, 25).  According to Kaltenthaler and 
Mora (2002, 81), “in the initial phases of the process [of integration], the primary motivation of 
Buenos Aires and Brasilia was to end the more than a century long rivalry and conflict between 
the two.”    
Carlos Menem and Fernando Collor de Melo, the subsequent presidents of Argentina and 
Brazil respectively, continued the process, signing the Act of Buenos Aires in July 1990 
(Kaltenthaler and Mora 2002, 75; Guerrero 2005, 21).  “The agreements’ significance is the 
effort of both countries to set aside centuries of rivalry and suspicion to create a basis for long-
lasting cooperation” (Kaltenthaler and Mora 2002, 82-83).  The process culminated when 
Menem and Collor, as well as the presidents of Paraguay and Uruguay, signed the Treaty of 
Asunción, establishing MERCOSUR.  At the signing of the Treaty, President Menem of 
Argentina said, “our concern is no longer armed warfare. Our most important concern must now 
be peace” (BBC, 1991). 
 Paraguay and Uruguay did not join the integration process until after Argentina and 
Brazil had initiated it with ABEIP and the Act of Buenos Aires (Cason 2000, 25; Phillips 2004, 
88; Guerrero 2005, 21, 27-28; Taiana 1995, 46).  At the time of these initiatives Uruguay had 
preferred to maintain narrow bilateral trade agreements with its two larger neighbors.  However, 
after the initiatives came into effect, “attempting to avoid the potential economic costs of 
marginalization from Argentine-Brazilian integration, Montevideo initiated and helped promote 
the idea of a regional free trade agreement” (Kaltenthaler and Mora 2002, 87).  When promoting 
the regional free trade agreement Uruguayan elites took several of the country’s unique 
characteristics into consideration. These included Uruguay’s intermediary geographic location 
between Argentina and Brazil, the existing infrastructure within Uruguay, and the concentrated 
financial activities of its neighbors in Montevideo.  Uruguay hoped that with the aforementioned 
characteristics as well as the higher levels of education of the populace, relative to those of its 
neighbors, that the small country could play an important role in the integration process, as well 
as serve as a hub between its two much larger neighbors (Fernandez 1992, 97-98; Phillips 2004, 
104).  A New York Times article from the month in which the Treaty was signed evidences these 
considerations in the following: “Uruguay is expected to emerge as a service and financial center 
for the common market.  It has the region’s top literacy rate, a strong university system and a 
tradition as a banking center for Argentine and Brazilians” (Brooke 1991, 2). 
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Paraguay, in large part, was brought into the integration process by Uruguay.  General 
Alfredo Stroessner’s authoritarian regime controlled Paraguay from 1954 to 1989, and as such 
the country lacked the institutional capacity to successfully negotiate its role in regional 
integration without Uruguay (Kaltenthaler and Mora 2002, 88). “The lack of experts on 
economic integration and negotiation in the [Paraguayan] foreign ministry resulted in Uruguay 
defining Paraguay’s interests in the process” (Kaltenthaler and Mora 2002, 88).  In fact, 
“Paraguay’s role in the negotiations leading to the Treaty of Asuncion was minimal at best” 
(Kaltenthaler and Mora 2002, 88). 
 For the newly democratic Paraguayan state, membership represented reversals away from 
the isolation and nationalism pervaded by the former authoritarian government, as well as 
legitimacy (Kaltenthaler and Mora 2002, 89; Phillips 2004, 104-105).  “Paraguayan motivations 
were in this sense essentially political rather than economic and centered around the promotion 
of international democratic legitimacy.  Indeed, the economic implications of membership were 
barely discussed at the time that the Paraguayan government signed the Treaty of Asunción” 
(Phillips 2004, 105). 
The initiative for integration was state-led, as opposed to the private sector encouraging 
the economic union, as critics might suggest.  MERCOSUR and its precursors came about 
primarily as a result of the efforts of the presidents of the four member countries (Cason 2000, 
26; Kaltenthaler and Mora 2002, 82).  According to Cason (2000, 26), “the private sector 
generally did not participate in the early negotiations.”  Many agricultural and industrial groups 
later saw the benefits to the opening up of markets, but the initiative did not originate with an 
economic actor (Cason 2000, 26; Kaltenthaler and Mora 2002, 82). 
 
Parting Remarks 
As was observed in Europe, a medium state initiated the integration process in the 
Southern Cone.  Throughout the twentieth century Brazil began to establish itself as the regional 
hegemon over Argentina.  Aldo Ferrer, who was that president of a major Argentinean bank 
during the late 1980s (Banco de la Provincia de Buenos Aires) and former Minister of 
Economics for the province of Buenos Aires, admits that the economic equilibrium between 
Argentina and Brazil had broken.  Ferrer believes that this became especially pronounced during 
the high level of growth maintained by the Brazilian economy after 1968 until the debt crisis 
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(Fernandez 1992, 68).  By the onset of ABEIP, it must be noted that, “Argentina had even 
acknowledged Brazil’s prominent political and economical role in Latin America” (Manzetti 
1990, 115). 
 This paper draws a second parallel between Western Europe and the Southern Cone: 
security was at the heart of both integration processes.  Rivalries and security concerns—though 
to disparate degrees of intensity on each continent—formed the backdrop to integration.  
Argentinean elites took security into consideration when they approached their Brazilian 
counterparts with ABEIP, the precursor to integration in the region.     
 The two small states joined the integration process relatively shortly after becoming 
democracies and at the first signs of the significance of the Act of Buenos Aires.  However, this 
paper was unable to find evidence that security played a large role in their decision to do so, as it 
had in Argentina’s.  Integration provided the smaller countries, particularly Paraguay, an 
opportunity to establish international legitimacy and attract foreign investment.  Further 
economic motivators resulted from the countries’ dependence on regional, specifically Brazilian, 
markets (Phillips 2004, 104).   
 Perhaps security was not at the core of the smaller countries’ decision to integrate, but 
they did, however, constrain their larger neighbors to a degree.  According to Phillips (2004, 
104), “over the 1990s the smaller countries did use their equal status in decision-making forums 
both to secure some temporary concessions and to contain the unilateral inclinations of the 
Brazilian and Argentine governments.”    
It might seem as though integration did not begin until MERCOSUR was signed into 
effect, signifying that evidence presented from anytime before the Treaty of Asunción is 
irrelevant, as earlier agreements were bilateral.  ABEIP and the Act of Buenos Aires were more 
than mere bilateral trade agreements between Argentina and Brazil, however; these treaties laid 
the foundation for the subsequent integration of the region.  As Manzetti (1990, 110) puts it, 
“ABEIP was based on an unprecedented formula for gradual unification that allowed new 
partners to join in the future.” 
 
Treaty of Ouro Preto (December 1994) 
This paper now turns to the second case of successful regional integration in the Southern 
Cone, the Treaty of Ouro Preto.  This treaty formalized the customs union between the four 
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member countries, including the free transit of goods and services, a common external tariff, and 
a common trade policy with external states. 
Once ABEIP and the Treaty of Asunción came into full effect, economic actors began to 
see the benefits of integration.  “Substantial portions of the business community actively 
supported integration, which made it more difficult for policy makers to turn back” (Cason 2000, 
29).  A preliminary example of the increasing level of trade within the region is that between 
1987 and 1994, in Argentina and Brazil the percentage of exports to their MERCOSUR partners 
(as a share of total exports) more than quadrupled (Cason 2000, 29).  The process became one of 
substantially increasing economic benefit and as such the role of politics shifted from if 
integration would occur to how it would.  
As is to be expected each country had its own vision of how further integration was to 
proceed.  “The Brazilian vision of the project emphasized a rather loose economic association in 
which institutionalization and policy harmonization were fervently resisted, as indeed was the 
broader notion of ‘deepening’ integration” (Phillips 2004, 101). This falls in line with the theory 
suggested by Kahler (2000, 665) that larger states avoid more legalized institutions, as they are 
routinely able to achieve positive outcomes through bargaining.  Excessive constraint from 
neighbors might have hindered “Brazil’s ambition to become a regional power—and, by 
extension, an important global player” (Weintraub 2000, 12). In an interview given to El Nuevo 
Herald the month before the signing of the Treaty of Ouro Preto, Brazil’s President-elect 
Fernando Cardoso mentions the role of his country in the world.  Cardoso says that Brazil is now 
liberated from the obstacles of the past as well as the burdensome external debt, having 
experienced growth for the past two years, due, in part, to MERCOSUR.  He goes on to 
emphasize how the opening up of the Brazilian economy globally and through regional 
integration allow Brazil to be more comfortable in international forums (Villapadierna 1994). 
 In contrast to Brazil’s emphasis on resisting deepened integration, Uruguay preferred 
further institutionalization. MERCOSUR has no formal dispute settlement system; disagreements 
are simply handled by political negotiation.  Deepened integration would provide small states an 
avenue through which to achieve redress when Brazil limits imports or exports or erects nontariff 
barriers without consulting the other members (Cason 2000, 29).  In addition, as discussed in the 
previous section, Uruguay’s desire to be a hub and natural point of entry to and from the region 
is reflected in its negotiation goals.  “In Mercosur negotiations the Uruguayan government has 
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consistently stressed the need to place infrastructural development at the heart of the regionalist 
project” (Phillips 2004, 104).  Furthermore, Uruguay sought to protect domestic industry by 
negotiating extended timescales and extensive lists of exempted products from lowered tariffs 
(Phillips 2004, 106; El Nuevo Herald 1994).   
“Argentine interest has been largely about trade” (Phillips 2004, 102).  A New York 
Times article from 1992—again outside of the year-and-a-half timeframe—agrees, “Mr. Peña, 
who has been one of the chief architects of MERCOSUR in his role as a senior official in the 
Argentine Foreign Ministry, has no doubts why such an agreement is good for Argentina.  A 
country of 32 million, Argentina offers a small domestic market for foreign investors.  But under 
Mercosur, building a plant in Argentina would also provide tariff-free access to Brazil and its 
population of 150 million” (Nash 1992). 
A distinct absence of state and institutional capacity as well as corruption has plagued 
Paraguay’s negotiations with the other MERCOSUR members.  The consequence has been that 
“governments have been unable effectively to represent Paraguayan interests in Mercosur 
negotiations or to secure concessions or compromise from the larger member states.  In other 
words, the point about the Paraguayan case is that no concrete or sustained vision of the 
regionalist project emerged over the 1990s, with the result that its participation in the bloc has 
been largely muted and marginal” (Phillips 2004, 105). 
 
Failed Attempt 
 In the following section, this paper considers an unsuccessful project to integrate the 
continent.  The Latin American Integration Association (LAIA), also known as ALADI, laid the 
framework for cooperation throughout the region of Latin America.  Established in August 1980, 
the association is a particularly enlightening example of an unsuccessful attempt at integration.  
LAIA neither set into motion a noteworthy trend towards integration nor a coherent integrationist 
political mission.  LAIA could not overcome the economic crises, differences in development 
models (including import substitution), and military regimes found throughout the region 
(Phillips 2004, 85).  
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Parting Remarks 
 Unlike the case discussed above, MERCOSUR is unique in that the recently 
democratically elected Argentinean and Brazilian Presidents set the project underway.  In both 
countries, the elections were the first time a democratically elected leader had handed the 
presidency over to another elected civilian leader, since the military regimes were in power 
(Taiana 1995, 41).  Furthermore, the threat to expel Paraguay from the organization precluded 
the military golpe de estado of the country’s elected government.  MERCOSUR subsequently 
made a state’s accession and membership contingent on democratic governance (Weintraub 
2000, xiv, 74).  Furthermore, the organization persisted despite the 2001 economic crisis in 
Argentina as well as several trade disputes, for example over the export of automobiles.  
The case of Ouro Preto and the failed attempt at regional integration in the Southern 
Cone reveal several trends.  First, the smaller states in the Cone saw integration as a prudent 
means of constraining their larger neighbors’ proven tendencies to act unilaterally, especially 
Brazil.  MERCOSUR ensured regularized forums, summits, and other channels of 
institutionalized diplomacy that encouraged a degree of Brazilian restraint.  Cason (2000, 38) 
puts it best by stating, “given Brazil’s economic importance and the other MERCOSUR 
countries’ dependence on its market, Brazil can act unilaterally when its interests require it to do 
so.  It does not necessarily have to consult before acting (though it frequently does).” 
 Second, the case of Ouro Preto demonstrates that the small states in the Southern Cone 
did not play as robust a role in ensuring regional integration as their counterparts in Western 
Europe.   The second European case analyzed within this paper presented evidence that the small 
European states played a more robust role than France, Germany, or Italy to ensure further 
integration on the continent.  Such effort was not necessary on the part of the small states of the 
Southern Cone, however, because the benefits of economic integration had become apparent in 
the region and as such business and industry encouraged politicians to realize integration by the 
timeline laid out.  The case of Ouro Preto presented some evidence that Uruguay looked to 
integrate Brazil further than was achieved; although, not as much as the efforts on the part of the 
Benelux countries regarding Germany.  This paper did not find any evidence that Paraguay was 
working to constrain the regional hegemon.  In fact, it is much more likely that Brazil was 
wielding its influence over an institutionally weaker Paraguay.   
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 Finally, the failed attempt demonstrates two noteworthy conditions, both of which are 
mirrored in the histories of Western Europe and the Southern Cone.  First, regional integration 
occurred and endured between democratic countries.  Second, the initial stages of integration 
were not region wide, unlike the failed LAIA proposal.  
 
Discussion of Findings 
Empirical Analysis  
 This research paper attempted to mitigate the influence of potential confounding 
variables by analyzing two separate cases of regional integration at various points in time, as 
well as failed attempts.  Doing so leaves weak the causal association between several potential 
confounding variables and the dependent variable analyzed here.   
The first confounding variable this research paper considers is the erosion of a state’s 
status as a world power.  The literature points out that a waning world power may integrate with 
surrounding states in an effort to preserve a degree of the dominance and prestige it once held.  
For example, George and Bache view Egypt’s nationalization of the Suez Canal in 1956 as 
having encouraged France to integrate with its European neighbors, as the country lost prestige 
(2000, 73-74).  This is not the case in the Southern Cone, however.  Although the Portuguese 
monarch moved to Brazil as Napoleon invaded, Brazil did not maintain the status that France 
held as a colonial power in the early twentieth century.  The parallel may be strengthened when 
applied to Argentina, as both medium states initiated integration by approaching the potential 
regional hegemon.  Several historical facts bolster this argument, such as the country’s wealth at 
the turn of the twentieth century and the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas War (CIA World 
Factbook 2010).  However, even taking Argentineans’ perceptions of their country into 
consideration, the argument that Argentina was a waning world power remains a difficult one to 
make.  Moreover, if this were the case then this variable would serve as an antecedent variable to 
the independent variable presented in this research paper.   
This paper considers the necessity of a similar culture and language within a region as a 
subsequent independent variable.  Hemmer and Katzenstein (1997, 576) purport that collective 
identity facilitates formal regional integration.  However, the variable proves insufficient at 
explaining integration when applied to both cases.  European elites simply do not share the same 
degree of cultural and linguistic commonalities as their South American counterparts.  
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The use of time in the research design weakens a third potential confounding variable, the 
Cold War.  Certainly the Cold War had a large effect on European integration (George 2001, 73); 
however, it is more difficult to say the same for the integration seen in the Southern Cone.  The 
first MERCOSUR case analyzed in this research paper occurred as the Cold War was winding 
down and the second occurred after the war had ended.  Furthermore, while the Cold War was 
being waged between the superpowers, an unsuccessful effort at integration was made in Latin 
America, as discussed in the Southern Cone failed attempt section of the paper.  
The last and most convincing potential confounding variable this paper considers is the 
influence the United States had on the two regions.  This may also be the most difficult variable 
to tease out.  Selected articles suggest that France and Brazil actively worked to prevent US 
influence from entering their spheres of interest throughout the analyzed periods of time.  
However, French and Brazilian attempts to erode U.S. influence merely serve to acknowledge 
the role yanqui pressures played in integration.  Working against U.S. influence proves that it 
was present.  However, DePorte (1979, 220-221) is most enlightening on the subject:  
“the United States government has supported the movement for European unity 
 throughout the postwar period…The Organization of European Economic Cooperation, 
 which grouped the European Marshall aid recipients, and the European Payments Union 
 both failed to lead even to first steps toward economic unity, and certainly not to 
 political…It might have remained there, notwithstanding all the support the United States 
 gave it, but for a remarkable initiative of French policy—probably the most original and 
 creative step taken by any European government since the war”  
 
The long-standing role the United States has played as a global leader is a potentially 
confounding variable that cannot be controlled for by space or time.  However, by 
acknowledging and analyzing failed attempts, this paper concludes that US influence was 
certainly not the only—and perhaps not even the primary—impetus to regional integration.  
This research paper now endeavors to understand why some attempts at 
institutionalization in Western Europe and the Southern Cone succeeded while others did not.  
First and foremost, it is important to acknowledge that in these cases regional integration 
occurred in several stages.  This is worth bearing in mind as regional integration may be the 
result of a state having played a more robust or determined role during a latter stage of 
integration, as opposed to the initial stage. 
Several salient factors appear throughout the cases analyzed in this research paper.  First, 
a security threat and a perceived regional hegemon were present in all cases, although to 
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different degrees on the two continents.  Second, the two initial cases leading to a still-standing 
regional organization were initiated by a middle power.  While the attempts that did not result in 
the present organizations were instigated by the large states, the United States, or small states. 
Third, small states played a disproportionate role in the second set of cases analyzed.  The 
Benelux countries arguably played a greater role in the maintenance and advancement of 
integration than did Uruguay; however, this paper presented evidence that small states 
encouraged institutionalization on both continents.   
Fourth, regional institutions provide small states the opportunity to multiply their 
influence.  Within the EEC the Benelux countries, which had worked together in the past within 
a customs union, could multiply their influence when voting.  Uruguay also brought Paraguay 
into MERCOSUR, an action that likely resulted in the multiplying of the former’s influence in 
institutional negotiations.  Fifth, apparently this scale of integration requires that states be led by 
democratic governments for states to gain and maintain membership in the organization. Finally, 
it appears that initiatives cannot begin at the regional level—they must consist of several states, 
not the majority of the states within a region.   
 The central research question of this paper is: which size of state most contributed to the 
establishment of the regional institutions found in Western Europe and the Southern Cone?  The 
answer: of the variables considered, medium states initiated the establishment of regional 
institutions in Western Europe and the Southern Cone while small states played a 
disproportionate role in the subsequent advancement of these same institutions.    
 
Theoretical Analysis 
Based on the empirical conclusions drawn and the presented evidence, the study now 
attempts to assess the theories presented at the beginning of this paper. 
The first hypothesis (H1) tested in this research paper is that small states play a 
disproportionate role in establishing formal regional institutions, as these institutions foster 
stability and constrain larger members from exercising power (Katzenstein).  The cases analyzed 
in this paper partially support this hypothesis.   
The EEC case analyzed above reveals that the Benelux countries strongly encouraged 
further integration in Western Europe.  They did so in an effort to foster regional stability by 
constraining Germany from wielding its power in the future.   
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In MERCOSUR, although the constraints may be minimal, Paraguay and Uruguay 
benefit as Brazil negotiates more often than it likely would if integration had not occurred.  This 
paper did not find evidence, however, demonstrating that regional stability was a concern of 
either Uruguay or Paraguay at the time of integration.              
In the second hypothesis (H2) presented in this paper, small states play a disproportionate 
role in the establishment of regional institutions as these institutions allow them to multiply their 
influence and lock in larger states (Fawcett). Within the EEC the Benelux countries were able to 
multiply their influence when majority votes were necessary.  Additionally, Uruguay brought 
Paraguay into MERCOSUR, which likely multiplied the former’s influence in negotiations.  
Moreover, in both cases the small states were able to ensure that the large state wielded much of 
its influence within the institution, instead of outside of it. Thus the evidence analyzed in this 
paper partially supports this hypothesis.   
The third hypothesis (H3) tested states that middle powers align with all neighbors in an 
effort to lessen traditional security dilemmas (Spero). In the case of the Southern Cone, this 
research paper established that a security dilemma existed between Argentina and Brazil prior to 
MERCOSUR.  Moreover, since integration began Argentina has aligned with all of its 
neighbors: Chile and Bolivia became associate members of MERCOSUR in 1996 and 1997 
respectively (Phillips 2004, 6, 106).  Though not discussed within this paper, Argentina had a 
tense relationship with Chile; similar to the relationship it shared with Brazil.  Several territorial 
disputes nearly led to war between the two southern most countries of the cone, but 
MERCOSUR has mollified the political hostilities that existed between what are now extensive 
trading partners (Weintraub 2000, xiv). In the case of Western Europe, as demonstrated 
throughout this research paper, due to a security dilemma France aligned itself with the 
perceived regional hegemon and subsequently with its other neighbors through integration.  
Today, the EU includes all of France’s neighbors outside of Andorra and Switzerland, neutral 
countries France would hardly view as threats. Thus, the evidence presented in the research 
paper supports this hypothesis.     
The fourth hypothesis (H4) tested in this research paper suggests that within a region in 
which the distribution of capabilities has shifted, or states expect a shift to occur, those states 
disadvantaged by the shift will resist regional integration.  This is the case as small and medium 
states expect the resultant institutions to reflect the interests of the larger states (Grieco).  
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Intrinsically, this theory appears correct, perhaps more so than the other four.  However, this 
paper finds little evidence to support (H4).  In fact, nearly all of the evidence runs contrary to this 
hypothesis.   
This paper presented evidence that in the case of the Southern Cone a shift in the 
distribution of capabilities occurred in Brazil’s favor.  As Argentinean elites began to 
acknowledge this shift, the Argentinean president approached his Brazilian counterpart in order 
to encourage regional integration.  Uruguay—and to a lesser extent Paraguay—eagerly joined 
the integration project shortly after they became democracies and the Act of Buenos Aires was 
signed.  
In Western Europe, a shift in the distribution of capabilities was underway, and those 
disadvantaged by the shift approached the rising power, West Germany.  As demonstrated, 
France initiated integration on the continent and the Benelux countries strongly supported the 
process.  Clearly, those states disadvantaged by a shift in capabilities on either continent did not 
resist regional integration; in fact, the disadvantaged states engendered it.  Events in the Southern 
Cone and Western Europe run contradictory to predictions made by (H4). 
The fifth hypothesis (H5) tested within this paper is that large states establish regional 
institutions as a means to consolidate their political influence over their weaker counterparts 
(Mansfield and Milner).  This hypothesis appears well argued, as large states began to express 
realpolitik through institutions more frequently than the traditional methods of history.  For 
example, this paper illustrated in the MERCOSUR case how Brazil acts unilaterally within the 
institution at times.   
In light of the central research question of this paper, however, large states are not the 
states that most contributed to the initial establishment or the advancement of these two regional 
institutions.  In fact, in the case of Western Europe, Germany’s suggestion to integrate was not 
well received in France.  Moreover, Brazil did not initiate ABEIP, the protocols that led to 
MERCOSUR.  In the Southern Cone and Western Europe, large states may have acquiesced to 
the establishment of regional institutions in order to consolidate their political influence, 
however they did not initiate the process.   
In sum, (H4) appears to be the most theoretically convincing, however this hypothesis 
was weakened by empirical evidence.  On the other hand, (H5) appears very convincing 
empirically.  However, through careful process tracing it comes to light that large states did not 
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initiate the process that led to integration, weakening this persuasive hypothesis.  All in all, it 
appears that (H3) as well as a combination of (H1) and (H2) are the most adept at answering the 
central research question.  This paper concludes that, of the independent variables analyzed, 
medium states are the most likely to play a disproportionate role in the initial establishment of 
regional institutions.  Furthermore, small states are the most likely to play a disproportionate role 
in the advancement of these institutions.         
As the chart below illustrates (H3) posses the most explanatory power followed by (H1) 
and (H2).  In the chart below each row represents one hypothesis, those emphasized possess 
greater explanatory power.  The column on the left lists the size of state that corresponds to each 
hypothesis.  The right-hand column contains brief summaries of each hypothesis. 
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integration 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over 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Conclusion 
This paper does not definitively show that Uruguay brought Paraguay into MERCOSUR 
negotiations in order to multiply the former’s influence.  Though this appears to be a probable 
conclusion, no conclusive evidence was found. Furthermore, this paper was unable to find 
evidence that a security dilemma played a role in Uruguay and Paraguay’s decisions to enter into 
the integration process.  Such evidence would strengthen the conclusions presented within this 
paper, however further research is needed.  Last, this study hinges on the terms small, medium, 
and large states. Evidence and references were presented to demonstrate that, within their 
respective regions, Argentina and France were in the process of becoming medium states.  This 
occurred while another state—Brazil or Germany—was rising, or was perceived to be rising to 
the position of large state.   
The conclusions presented by this paper have strong external validity that may be 
generalized to other regions of the world.  Further research would reveal if Canada, arguably a 
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medium state, initiated integration with the United States and subsequently Mexico in the North 
America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).  These results may also span time. Should current 
momentum continue, Japan may initiate regional integration with China, if the perceived shift in 
power continues in the latter’s favor.  Other states, such as South Korea or Vietnam, may then 
encourage further integration in an effort to lock in their larger neighbor and multiply their own 
influence.  As mentioned above (MERCOSUR failed attempts section), it would be interesting to 
see if regional integration is able to include a non-democracy, if the governments remain as they 
are at present.  This issue remains pertinent, as North Korea reminded its neighbors of the 
security dilemma by shelling a populated South Korean island in November 2010 (Kim and Jae-
won 2010).    
Further research is necessary to determine whether a security dilemma is required for 
regional integration to occur.  As demonstrated by this paper, a security dilemma was present in 
the Southern Cone and Western Europe at the time of integration.  A cursory glance suggests that 
the African Union may have had a form of a security dilemma at its inception; however, this 
form of dilemma does not immediately come to mind when looking at NAFTA.     
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